A REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE BRITISH NATION.

Thursday, July 10. 1707.

I Now come to my old Friend again that ſent me the Letter, in which his next Enquiry is, what is my Opinion of the Battle of *Almanza*, and what Part has the Earl of *Galloway* acted there? — I underſtand that Queſtion, to mean if he has acted wiſely or ſoldierly, or not? for 'tis very much the Cuſtom of this Age, and in *England* eſpecially, that whenever a Diſaſter happens, the Actors are rumag'd for Miſcarriage.

Now I ſhall not be backward to anſwer this Gentleman very directly to his Queſtion, *what do I think of the Battle of* Almanza? — What do I think! why I think, Sir, as every Body muſt think— *I think we were beaten*— entirely defeated, routed, overthrown, or whatever a *Jacobite*, a *French-man*, or what you pleaſe, can deſire— And why ſhould *England* be aſham'd to own a Defeat! 'tis for *France*, who is oblig'd to keep up the Hearts of his People by Artifice, Trick, Sham, &c. diminiſhing Loſſes, heightning petty Advantages, and blinding his Subjects Eyes; 'tis, I ſay, for *France* to conceal things, give wrong Accounts, and amuſe the World, to keep up the Spirits of a diſcourag'd Nation.

Our Affairs, Bleſſed be GOD, are under no ſuch Neceſſity; 'tis no Diſhonour for an Army to be beaten—Nor would I have *Engliſh-men* conceal their Loſſes, as if they were afraid to let the World know they had the worſt——*We were beaten*, well, what then, Gentlemen *High-Flyers*, Gentlemen *Jacobites*? You that rejoyce at the Overthrow of your own Country; you that on the 10*th* of *June* drank the D. of *Berwick*'s Health, and wiſh'd more *Britiſh* Regiments cut to pieces by him and his *French* Papiſts; you that went in the Dark to the Market-Croſs

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of a certain united City, and there were not asham'd to huzzah for K. *James* VIII.— Of whom and your merry Meeting we may say something hereafter—*Well, we were beaten*, the Chance of War turn'd against us— And what now—— What have you to say to it? ——

First of all, Dyed Abner *as a Fool dy'd.* Did the Troops dye like *English-men*, did they fight it out, did they sell the *French* a dear Victory, or did they run away like Poltrons? Did they fly like the *French* Infantry at *Ramellies*, that hardly ever engag'd — Was there ever a Regiment of *English* Guards there, of 3 Battalions, who, like the Regiment *Du Roy* at *Ramellies*, surrendred their Arms, and begg'd Quarter of one Regiment of *Scots* Dragoons? Was there any Officer or Soldier that did not do his Duty, and tho' engaging against almost two to one, had not the *Portuguese* quitted the Field, or had there been no *Portuguese* there, in all Probability you had heard another Story, and a better Account of that Battle had been given? Nay, the very thing you boast of, *viz.* That all the Infantry was either kill'd or taken, is a plain Demonstration of the thing I am upon, that they fought like *English-men*, that is to say, to the last Gasp; and this may instruct the Enemy, that if they will do any Good upon the *English*, it must always be with Numbers, and they must always fight two to one; let any Man tell us in the *French* Army, where were our Colonels kill'd but at the Head of their Regiments; even our scatter'd Foot were rally'd on the Plain, where they were routed, and the poor Remnant that were got together tho' often charg'd in their Retreat, sav'd themselves for a Capitulation. It can be no Dishonour to be thus beaten; the bravest Man in the World may be beaten, and the best Army may be overpower'd.

Secondly, Are we beaten *so*, as not to show our Faces again? Do the Gentlemen in *Spain* expect to see us there no more? Are there no more *Britains* left to take up their Quarrel? *No, no, Gentlemen*, the *French* themselves are not of that Mind, they know us better than so, and therefore I expect, they will make the best of their Time to make K. *Charles* abandon *Spain*, if it be possible, before the Relief we shall send him can arrive; but let not our Friends the *Jacobites* flatter themselves with such weak Expectations——But if they will effect their Work nicely, if they will do it like Workmen, let them fit out their Fleet now with their usual Expedition, come out of their Harbours, and beat the Confederate Fleet too, that the Succours to be sent may not reach them, then they do their Business, this would finish the Defeat of King *Charles*, and effectually drive him out of *Spain*; but this they will not do in haste neither.

Now let us come to the ill Conduct that is enquir'd after; and *first*, how did my Lord *Galloway* behave? to this I answer, *In the Field* gallantly, *as he ever did*, and with the same Prudence as well as Bravery, which made the old Duke *Schombergh* say, he was the best Officer the King of *France* had, as to his Conduct as a General; let the Posting the Brigade of Foot in each Wing of Horse testifie for him, a Method first practis'd by that true Original of the Art of War, *Gustavus Adolphus*, King of *Sweden*, and a Method, which as it sav'd the left Wing in this Fight, so had the *Portuguese* stood their Ground, had certainly sav'd the right, and perhaps had gain'd the Battle—— This intermingling Foot among the Horse was the thing that gain'd the great Battle at *Lutzen* in *Germany*, where that brave King was kill'd in the Head of his victorious Army. It was the saving of the *Swedish* Horse at the Battle of *Nordlingen*, and has hardly ever been practis'd without Success. As to the personal Gallantry of my Lord *Galloway*, if it needed any Testimony, I believe, his Enemies would supply it; but in the mean time, let two Cuts in his Face be his Witnesses; the *Romans* counted a Wound in the Face the greatest Trophy of Honour in the World, and any Wound behind was equally dishonourable —What could the E. of *Galloway*, had he been a private Trooper, have acquir'd more Honour in, than that having but one hand to fight with, he came up to the Teeth of the Enemy, and brought away the Proof of it in his Face.

But if as a General, his Lordship expos'd himself so as to be cut in the Face, it is very plain, it was close Work, and well follow'd.

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—Let no Man therefore take up any Reproach on a Gentleman, whose Conduct, the whole fighting Part of *Europe* knows is unexceptionable, and pretend to blame him for not obtaining the Victory.

Another Sort of People blame the thing in general, and cry out, as I have said in other Cases, it was not their Business to fight, and here I think he is justified: for it, as appears by the publick Account printed by Authority, the *French* would have cut off their Retreat, and that their Magazines were exhausted, they were then under a Necessity to fight; and in all such Cases of Necessity it has been the Practice of the greatest Generals in the World to fight while their Men were in Heart, and their Courage as well as Bodies fresh, rather than to stay till straitned for Provisions, they faint, and by retreating lose their Spirit.

Thus Prince *Lewis* of *Baden* fought the great Battle at *Salenkement* in *Hungary*, when his Provisions were cut off, and tho' not one to three he attack'd the Enemy first.

The old King of *Sweden*, *Gustavus Adolphus*, whom I often quote on these Accounts, and of whose Actions I have some particular Manuscripts by me, us'd to say, that there was always one in five odds, in leading an Army on to attack their Enemies, and waiting till they were attack'd by them; the one look'd like an Assurance of Victory, and the other had a Distrust or Fear of being beaten in the very Countenance of the Action; and I believe in general Observation, it would be found true, that 'tis not one time in five but the Army that attacks, has the Victory, and most of the Actions of this Age have witnessed it; I remember but three that have miscarry'd, *viz.* K *William* at *Steenkirk*, the *French* and the D. of *Savoy* attacking Prince *Eugene* at *Chiari*, and the *French* attacking P. *Lewis* in the Lines at *Stolhoffen*: But at the Abbey of St. *Denis* at *Mons*, at *Mons Castle*, at *Flerus*, at *Landen*, at *Skellembergh*, at *Blenheim*, at *Turin*, at *Narva*, the late Action in *Saxony* between the *Swedes* and *Saxons*, and since between King *Augustus* and the *Swedes*, and innumerable Instances are to be given, where the Assailants always prevail.

If then the E. of *Galloway* saw a Necessity to fight, it was his Business to be the Assailant, and to take the Advantage of the Spirit and Vigor of his Soldiers, who in those hot Countries seldom are so healthy as in other Places.

And I cannot but here complain of it, as a Misfortune to *Britain*, not that we are oblig'd to fight in that Country, but that our Men have a particular Faculty not to have the least Regard to their Health, or in the least to govern themselves there, where the Fruits of the Earth, the Grapes especially, are as fatal, as they are tempting to them; and this makes our Men sink in their Numbers more there than in any other Place—

How else think you should it be, that the whole *English* and *Dutch* Forces, which the E. of *Galloway* could draw together, tho' after the Army, which went with the E. of *Rivers* was joyn'd, did not exceed 16000 Men, after so many Succours and Additions as have been sent thither?

I wish, this were rightly represented to our Governors, whom it may concern, as it has but one Remedy, *viz.* to send none but old Regiments to *Spain*; the old beaten Fellows, that have seen a Campaign or two, and are harden'd to the Field, are more wary of themselves, they know what it is to be sick, and have seen the raw young Fellows dye in Ditches for Want of Care, and these will hold it; but if you will always send new rais'd Regiments to *Spain*, you must allow one third at least to dye by the Flux, and by Surfeits, and send in Proportion, which is a heartless Work, and has two Evils besides the Loss of the Men.

1. 'Tis excessive chargeable to the Publick to send larger Recruits, and oftner than in the other Case they need to do, and raising, equiping and furnishing new Armies.

2. 'Tis a Discouragement to a General, when he knows things are expected of him by the World, suitable to the Forces he has under him, while the best Part of his Army is oblig'd to encamp in the Hospitals instead of the Field, and the Lives are shortned by the Dittempers of the Country, not by the Hands of the Enemy.

All these things however serve to defend the Conduct of our General, and of all his Officers; and I know nothing can reflect upon